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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
rect in early times when the population was small, is a proper subject for in-
vestigation and criticism today. The Missouri courts have uniformily adopted
the common-law rule. Omission of or mistake in the middle letter between
the Christian name and surname is immaterial. Arme v. Shephard, 6 Mo. 606;
King v. Clark, 7 Mo. 267. Where Mary Ann Byers was described as Mary E.
Byers in an order of publication, the court said, "She was properly notified,
as the middle name is no part of her name in law." Beckner v. McLenn, 107
Mo. 277; also Keaton v. Jorndt, 22 Mo. 117. "Its insertion or absence does
not affect the question of identity one way or the other." Phillips v. Evans,
64 Mo. 17. Writing initials of middle name Mc instead of M was no variance.
Campbell v. Wolf, 33 Mo. 459; also 107 Mo. 277. In a criminal cause, it was
immaterial that John L. Black, was indicted under the name of John D. Black.
Missouri v. Black, 12 Mo. A. 531. The United States Supreme Court has adopted
a similar view in civil cases. Keene v. Meade, 3 Pet. 1, 7 L. Ed. 581; Games
v. Stites, 14 Pet. 322, 10 L. Ed. 476. For similar cases in other jurisdictions,
see 19 R. C. L. 1328, 29 Cyc. 265, 6, 14 Encyc. of PI. & Pr. 276 n. 1, 21 Am. Rep.
181, 132 A. L. R. 567, 14 L. R. A. 690.
A contrary view seems established in Mass., Minn., and Maine and is to be
found in scattered cases in other jurisdictions. In Com. v. Beechley, 145 Mass.
181, an indictment for threatening Frank E. White was not sustained by proof
that Frank A. White was the one threatened. Justice Holmes saying, "It is
settled in this Commonwealth that a middle name or initial is part of the name,
and a variance in regard to it is fatal." "It cannot be said as a matter of law,
that A, and E are the same." Same rule in Minnesota. D'Autremont v. An-
derson Iron Co., 104 Minn. 165, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 216. Dutton v. Simmons,
65 Mo. 538. The Massachusetts doctrine seems more in accordance with the
exigencies of modern society. No department store or post-office would con-
sider two names with different initials as identifying the same person. Total
omission of a middle name or initial is no variance. State v. Ross, 7 Mo. 464.
Since the use of middle names and initials is common, and in view of the size
of our population, a factor making numerous duplications in names, it would
seem that the better rule would be that in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary the court cannot presume as a matter of law that two names with dif-
ferent middle initials identify one and the same individual. M. L. S. '27.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-WHEN A VERBAL SALE Is NoT WITHIN THE STATUTE.-
Defendant who is sued in trespass, purchased property by verbal contract,
entered into possession, and made improvements using the premises as his home.
Held, verbal sale of realty, taken possession of by vendee, improving same, and
paying purchase price, is not with Statute of Frauds. Hofheinz v. Wilson et al.,
(Texas) 286 S. W. 958.
The doctrine of part performance is purely equitable. Aylor v. McTurf, 184
Mo. App. 691, 171 S. W. 606. At law no amount of part performance except
complete and full performance by at least one party thereto will take the
case out of the Statute. Sursa v. Cash, 171 Mo. App. 396, 156 S. W. 779;
Shaklett v. Cummins, 178 Mo. App. 309, 165 S. W. 1145. A law court may,
however, give remedy on an implied promise as in Hubbard v. Glass Works,
188 Mo. 18, 86 S. W. 82, where the plaintiff upon entering possession made im-
provements. Improvements, however, as grounds for specific performance
must have been made with the expectation that the contract would be fulfilled,
and not after it was known that it would be. Parke & Barron v. Leewright,
20 Mo. 85. In Carney v. Carney, 95 Mo. 353, 8 S. W. 729, two sons by oral
agreement took care of their parents in contemplation of receiving the property.
They, having performed their part, the court carried out the contract on implied
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promise. Such part performance as would warrant a decree for specific per-
formance in equity is sufficient defense in law for ejectment. In Johnson et al.
v. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513, 22 S. W. 492, the defendant who was led by a land
owner to believe an agent had authority to sell particular land was sued in
ejectment, but specific performance of the contract was decreed. Similarly, held
in Hubbard v. Hubbard, 140 Mo. 300, 41 S. W. 749. In no instances, however,
is mere part payment of the purchase price sufficient to entitle a party to specific
performance of contract to convey land. Parke & Barron v. Leewright, 20 Mo.
85. If an oral agreement is followed by possession, the taking of possession is
sufficient performance to take the case out of the Statute. Young v. Mont-
gomery, 28 Mo. 604. Even an equitable interest may be sold verbally if pos-
session is taken by the vendee, Rosenberger v. Jones et al., 118 Mo. 559, 24
S. W. 203. Entry into possession with consent of the vendor is sufficient part
performance in favor of vendor. Tatum v. Brooker, 51 Mo. 148; Luckett v.
Williamson, 37 Mo. 388, contra. The vendee in possession may enforce specific
performance of contract against vendor. Adair v. Adair, 78 Mo. 63; Emmel et
al. v Hayes et al., 102 Mo. 186, 14 S. W. 209. The possession must, however,
be under contract and not a mere tenancy. Price v. Hart, 29 Mo. 171. In
White v Watkins, 23 Mo. 423, the court held abandoned possession insufficient
to take case out of the Statute of Frauds. Nor is mere continuance in pos-
session considered sufficient to take case out of the Statute of Frauds. Nor is
mere continuance in possession considered sufficient part performance. Emrel
et al. v. Hayes et al., supra, overruling Simmons v. Headier, 94 Mo. 482, 7 S. W.
20. In Missouri an oral promise to convey an interest in land by way of com-
pensation is not within the Statute of Frauds, Teats v. Flanders, 118 Mo. 660,
24 S. W. 126; Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37. In the latter case the court held
great patience with the grantees' infirmities required in addition to good temper,
forbearance, honest effort to please, good food, medicine, and clothing.
E. C. F. '27.
WEAPONS-CONCEALMENT IN Au'rOMoBLE.-Defendant prosecuted for carrying
pistol in pocket of left front door of automobile. Held, carrying pistol in
pocket of automobile door, flap of pocket being down, is not carrying weapon
"concealed or on person." State v. Brunson, 162 La. 162, 111 So. 321.
This case is clearly against weight of authority. In Lewallen v. State, 148
Tenn. 326, 255 S. W. 373, the defendant when caught operating a still, reached
over a nearby log, secured a pistol and presented it in a threatening manner, court
held this sufficient carrying of a pistol for purpose of being armed. The carry-
ing of a pistol in a grip, satchel, or handbag was held to be a violation of statute
against carrying concealed weapons in State v. Blazovitch, 88 W. Va. 612, 107
S. E. 291. Similarly carrying of pistol in basket in one's hand is carrying on
and about the person. Johnson v. State 51 Tex. Cr. App. 648, 104 S. W. 902. In
Missouri courts have held that the concealment need not be on the person, as
the offense is made out if the concealed weapon is in such proximity to accused
as to be within reach and convenient control. State v. Conley, 280 Mo. 21, 217
S. W. 29. Same rule was applied in State v. Mulconry, 270 S. W. 375 (Mo.)
where the pistol was behind the driver's body, on seat of the automobile. In
this case, however, the court further instructed the jury, that there would be no
concealment if the weapon were in plain view. In State v. Renard, (Mo.) 273
S. W. 1058, an officer making an arrest by feeling with hand, found a loaded
revolver on floor of automobile, at defendant's feet; the night being so dark
that the pistol could not be seen, the offense was held a concealment of the
weapon. In State v. Scanlan, 308 Mo. 683, three revolvers were found on floor
of automobile, and three pistols were found on rear seat after six men were
ordered out of the car by officers. The men were seen, seemingly taking some-
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